

Claimant has Meniere's disease, a condition that causes her to lose her balance and fall. She takes medicine that generally controls the Meniere's. Claimant testified that the Meniere's was controlled at the time she fell on April 1, 1999. Nothing in the medical or other evidence contradicts claimant's testimony on this point.

On the basis of these facts, the ALJ awarded claimant medical treatment and the Board agrees. Respondent makes two points to challenge this conclusion. First, respondent contends the injury was caused by claimant's personal condition, the Meniere's disease. An injury that arises only from a personal condition of the employee, with no other factors as a cause, is not compensable. *Bennett v. Wichita Fence Co.*, 16 Kan. App. 2d 458, 824 P.2d 1001, *rev. denied* 250 Kan. 804 (1992). In this case claimant testified the Meniere's disease was under control. While the evidence also shows that claimant sometimes fell even when the disease was under control, nothing in the evidence to date indicates claimant's fall on April 1, 1999, was caused by this condition.

Respondent next cites provisions of K.S.A. 44-508(e) stating an injury should not be deemed to be caused by employment if the disability results from the natural aging process or the "activities of day-to-day living." Respondent contends walking up stairs is an activity of day-to-day living and claimant's injury is not compensable for that reason. Walking up stairs, respondent argues, is something people commonly do as a part of day-to-day living at home and in public.

The Board does not construe the provision of K.S.A. 44-508(e) as respondent urges. The Board does not consider injury from a fall while walking up stairs at work to be injury resulting from "activities of day-to-day living." The injury resulted from the fall and a fall is not, in our view, an "activity of day-to-day living." The reference to injury caused by activities of day-to-day living should be construed as a reference to injury that occurs from the gradual wear of day-to-day activities no more at work than away from work as in *Boeckmann v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.*, 210 Kan. 733, 504 P.2d 625 (1972).

**WHEREFORE**, it is the finding, decision, and order of the Appeals Board that the preliminary hearing Order entered by Administrative Law Judge John D. Clark on November 16, 1999, should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Dated this \_\_\_\_ day of February 2000.

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BOARD MEMBER

c: Orvel B. Mason, Arkansas City, KS  
Richard J. Liby, Wichita, KS  
John D. Clark, Administrative Law Judge  
Philip S. Harness, Director